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t: Ohio Rule 901 governs authentication, including the 
[1 authentication of documents, the identification of real 
~evidence, and the verification of a speaker's voice. The 
= authentication requirement imposes on the offering party 
:':: the burden of proving that an item of evidence is genuine 
: -that it is what it purports to be. Typically, this rule requires 
1 the proponent to use a sponsoring witness to identify 
, documents and real evidence. A select category of docu-
' ments, however, is self-authenticating under Rule 902. 
In making authentication a prerequisite to admissibili-
ty, Rule 901 is consistent with prior Ohio law. See Steinle 
v. Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 550, 53 N.E.2d 800 (1944) 
(document inadmissible due to lack of authentication); 
Gutman v. Industrial Comm., 71 Ohio App. 383, 385, 50 
N.E.2d 187, 188 (1942) ("When an object, article, machine, 
machine part, tool, weapon or similar concrete thing is to 
be used in evidence to prove a fact with which it is related 
as of a previous time or event, it is not competent evidence 
unless it is first shown to be substantially in the condition 
as of the time or event to which it is claimed to be related."). 
Because of the availability of pretrial discovery proce-
dures, authentication is rarely a significant problem in 
civil cases. For example, Ohio Civ. R. 36(A) provides for 
requests for admissions as to the genuineness of docu-
ments. In addition, pretrial conferences under Civ. R. 16 
are designed, in part, to obtain "admissions into evidence 
of documents and other exhibits which will avoid 
unnecessary proof." In criminal cases, however, the 
authentication rule still plays a critical role. 
TRIAL COURT'S FUNCTION 
Rule 901(A) is the general provision governing authen-
tication. It reads: 
The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter 
is what its proponent claims. 
The rule represents a special application of Rule 104(8) 
on conditional relevancy. The trial court does not decide 
whether evidence is authentic by a preponderance of 
evidence, the typical standard for admissibility issues. 
Rather, the court decides only whether sufficient 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
evidence has been introduced to support a finding of 
authenticity- a prima facie standard. If sufficient 
evidence has been adduced to support a finding of 
authenticity, the evidence is admitted, and the jury 
decides whether the evidence is authentic. Of course, 
the opposing party may introduce evidence to dispute 
authenticity. 
Rule 901(8) presents examples of traditional method_, 
of authentication. These examples are merely illustrative; 
the list is not exhaustive. 
OTHER EVIDENCE RULES 
Rule 901 governs only authentication. A document 
properly authenticated under Rule 901 may nevertheless 
be inadmissible because it fails to satisfy the require-
ments of the hearsay rule (Rule 802), or the best evidence 
rule (Rule 1002), or because its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Rule 403(A)). 
REAL EVIDENCE: CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
Real evidence- tangible evidence historically 
connected to a case - may be identified in either of two 
ways. First, real evidence may be identified by means of 
a "chain of custody." Second, real evidence may be iden-
tified by establishing characteristics that make the item 
"readily identifiable." See McCormick, Evidence 667-68 
(3d ed. 1984); Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling 
of Real Evidence, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 527 (1983). 
If an item of evidence is readily identifiable, there is 
usually no need to establish a chain of custody. In State 
v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d 382,415 N.E.2d 303 (1980), the 
Ohio Supreme Court wrote: "A strict chain of custody is 
not always required in order for physical evidence to be 
admissible ... In order to establish sufficient relevance 
of clothing to the crime the offeror of the evidence must 
show that there is identity between the clothing and the 
crime, that the clothing is in substantially the same condi-
tion as it was at the time of the crime, and that it is proba-
tive of an element of the crime." /d. at 389,415 N.E.2d at 
308. In State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App.2d 54, 288 N.E.2d 
296 (1971), the court commented: "If an exhibit is directly 
identified by a witness as the object which is involved in 
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the case, then that direct identification is sufficient. Such 
is the case with many objects which have special iden-
tifying characteristics, such as a number or mark, or 
made to.hav!3 such identifying characteristics by special 
marks." /d. at 59,288 N.E.2d at 300. 
Numerous examples of authenticating readily identifia-
ble objects are found in the cases. All these examples 
involve objects whose characteristics somehow make 
them unique. For example, any item imprinted with a seri-
al number, such as a weapon, may be identified by that 
number. Jackson v. State, 241 Ark. 850, 854, 410 S.W.2d 
766, 769 (1967). Second, an object that is inscribed with 
the initials or markings of a police officer or other person 
may be readily identifiable. United States v. Madril, 445 
F.2d 827, 828 (9th Cir. 1971)(pistol), vacated on other 
grounds, 404 U.S. 1010 (1972). Third, an object may 
possess distinctive natural characteristics which may 
make it identifiable. United States v. Briddle, 443 F.2d 
443,448-49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971). 
See also State v. Kehn, 50 Ohio St.2d 11, 16,361 N.E.2d 
1330, 1333-34 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977) 
(address book a.amitted); Avon Lake v. Anderson, 10 
Ohio App.3d 297,298, 462 N.E.2d 188, 189 (1983) (officer 
identified his initials on items); Gutman v.lndustrial Comm., 
71 Ohio App. 383, 385-86, 50 N.E.2d 187, 188 (1942) 
(steering wheel excluded due to lack of identification). 
Chain of Custody 
Real evidence may be identified by means of a chain 
of custody; that is, the testimony of witnesses who have 
had custody of the evidence from the time of seizure until 
the time of trial. This means of identification is simply a 
cat~gj:)r:y5?fBLIJ~ ~01(B){1)- authentication by testimony. 
See McCormick, Evidence 668 (3d ed. 1984); Giannelli, 
Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 
Am. Grim. LRev. 527 (1983). A chain of custody is 
required only if the item is not readily identifiable or is 
susceptible to alteration or contamination. 
In State v. Moore, 47 Ohio App.2d 181,353 N.E.2d 866 
{1973), the court commented: 
The burden of establishing a chain of evidence to 
identify the specimens or exhibits is upon the state. 
... However, the burden is not an absolute one. 
Where there is no evidence indicating confusion with 
the identity of the specimen or of the possibility of 
tampering with it, then the testimony of the expert 
should be admitted .... The practicalities of proof do 
not require the state to negate all possibilities of substi-
tution or tampering. The state need only establish that 
it is reasonably certain that substitutions, alternation or 
tampering did not occur.ld, at 183; 353 N.E.2d at 870. 
See also State v. Blevins, 36 Ohio App.3d 147, 521 N.E.2d 
1105 (1987); State v. Reese, 56 Ohio App.2d 278, 382 
N.E.2d 1193 (1978); State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App.2d 54, 
288 N.E.2d 296 (1971); Columbus v. Marks, 118 Ohio App. 
359, 194 N.E.2d 791 (1963); State v. Myers, 82 Ohio Abs. 
216, 164 N.E.2d 585 (App. 1959). 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
Most documents are not self-authenticating. There-
fore, an authenticating witness must be called to identify 
the document. Rule 901(B) provides numerous illustrations. 
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Testimony of Witness with Knowledge 
Rule 901(B)(1) provides that the testimony of a witness 
with knowledge is sufficient to authenticate an item of 
evidence. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal 
Rule 901 contains the following comment: "Example (1) 
contemplates a broad spectrum ranging from testimony 
of a witness who was present at the signing of a docu-
ment to testimony establishing narcotics as taken from 
an accused and accounting for custody through the peri-
od until trial, including laboratory analysis." See St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Ohio Fast Freight; 8 Ohio 
App.3d 155, 158,456 N.E.2d 551,559 (1982) ("The 
common manner of identifying a document is through 
testimony of a witness with knowledge"). 
Nonexpert Opinion of Handwriting 
Rule 901(B)(2) provides that nonexpert opinion testimony 
as to the genuineness of handwriting is sufficient to 
authenticate a document. The offering party must estab-
lish that the witness is sufficiently familiar with the hand-
writing of the purported author to offer a valid opinion as 
to the authenticity of the document in question. See 
McCormick, Evidence § 221 (3d ed. 1984); 3 Wigmore, 
Evidence§§ 693-708 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 7/d. § 1996 
(Chadbourn rev. 1978). According to the rule, familiarity 
with the handwriting of another acquired "for purposes of 
the litigation" may not be the basis of authentication. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 901 
comments: "Example (2) states conventional doctrine as 
to lay identification of handwriting, which recognizes that 
a sufficient familiarity with the handwriting of another 
person may be acquired by seeing him write, by 
exchanging correspondence, or by other means, to 
afford a basis for identifying it on subsequent occasions." 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See Holtz v. Dick, 
42 Ohio St. 23 (1884); Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5 (1831). See also 
Bell v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 690, 696, 10 N.E. 679, 683 
(1887); Railroad Co. v. Schultz, 43 Ohio St. 270,281, 1 N.E. 
324,331 (1885); Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio 426,441 (1850). 
Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness 
Rule 901(B)(3) provides that an item of evidence may 
be authenticated by comparison with specimens by the 
trier of fact or by an expert witness. See also Rule 702 
(qualifications of expert witnesses). The rule is not limit-
ed to comparisons of handwriting; it encompasses 
comparisons of other types of evidence, such as bullets, 
blood specimens, and fingerprints. E.g., State v. Bayless, 
48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 
911 (1978) (bullet comparison); Burchett v. State, 35 Ohio 
App. 463, 172 N.E. 555 (1930) (bullet comparison). See 
generally Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 
ch. 14 {1986). 
The Ohio cases have recognized the admissibility of 
expert testimony on handwriting comparisons. See Bell 
v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 690, 10 N.E. 679 (1887); Koons v. 
State, 36 Ohio St. 195 (1880); Bragg v. Colwell, 19 Ohio 
St. 407 (1869); Calkins v. State, 14 Ohio St. 222 (1863); 
Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio 426 (1850). See also Giannelli & 
lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence ch. 21 (1986); McCor-
mick, Evidence§ 205 (3d ed. 1984); 7 Wigmore, Evidence 
§2008-2015 (Chadbourne rev. 1978). 
A recent review of handwriting comparison raises 
some interesting questions. A review of five handwriting 
comparison proficiency tests showed that at best 
"[d)ocument examiners were correct 57% of the time 
and incorrect 43% of the time." Risinger, Den beaux & 
Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For Rational 
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification 
"Expertise," 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 748 (1989). 
The handwriting exemplars (specimens) that are used 
for comparative purposes must themselves be authenti-
cated. In other words, the rule raises a "double authenti-
cation" problem; the known exemplars must be 
authenticated before the item of evidence (the ques-
tioned document) is compared. The common law tradi-
tion placed the responsibility for determining the 
authenticity of exemplars upon the trial court. See Pavey 
v. Pavey, 30 Ohio St. 600, 603 (1876) (beyond reasonable 
doubt); Bragg v. Colwell, 19 Ohio St. 407 (1869). Rule 901 
changes this approach, treating authentication of exem-
plars the same as authentication of the questioned docu-
ment. The trial court decides only whether there is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of authenticity of 
the exemplars. The jury then decides whether the exem-
plars are, in fact, authentic. The Advisory Committee's 
Note to Federal Rule 901 comments: 
While-explainable as a measure of prudence in the 
process of breaking with precedent in the handwriting 
situation, the reservation to the judge of the question of 
the genuineness of exemplars and the imposition of an 
unusually high standard of persuasion are at variance 
with the general treatment of relevancy which depends 
upon fulfillment of a condition of fact. Rule 104(b). No 
similar attitude is found in other comparison situations, 
e.g., ballistics comparison by jury ... and no reason 
appears for its continued existence in handwriting 
cases. Consequently example (3) sets no higher stan-
dard for handwriting specimens and treats all compari-
son situations alike, to be governed by Rule 104(b). 
Constitutional challenges to the obtaining of handwriting 
exemplars from criminal defendants have been raised. 
Compelling an accused to provide handwriting exemplars 
does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 
See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); Gilbert v. 
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Exemplars which are the 
product of an illegal arrest or seizure, however, may be 
suppressed. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
Distinctive Characteristics 
Rule 901(B)(4) provides that "[a]ppearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteris-
tics, taken in conjunction with circumstances" is sufficient 
authentication of an item of evidence. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to Federal Rule 901 states: 
The characteristics of the offered item itself, considered 
in the light of circumstances, afford authentication tech-
niques in great variety. Thus a dorument or telephone 
conversation may be shown to be er •. anated from a partic-
ular person by virtue of its disclosing knowledge of facts 
known peculiarly to him; ... similarly, a letter may be 
authenticated by content and circumstances indicating it 
was in reply to a duly authenticated one ... Language 
patterns may indicate authenticity or its opposite ... 
See McCormick, Evidence§ 225 (3d ed. 1984) (reply letters 
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and telegrams); 7 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2148-2157 
(Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
Public Records and Reports 
Rule 901(B)(7) provides that evidence that "a writing 
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact 
recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public 
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any 
form, is from the public office where items of this nature 
are kept" is sufficient authentication of such record or 
report. "Public records are regularly authenticated by 
proof of custody, without more ... The example extends 
the principle to include data stored in computers and 
similar methods ... "Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 901. See also McCormick, Evidence§ 224 (3d ed. 
1984); 7 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2158, 2159 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1978). 
This rule deals with only one method of authenticating 
public records. Many public records are self-
authenticating under Rule 902. In addition, Rule 
901(B)(10) provides that any method of authentication 
recognized by statute or rule may be used. Authentica-
tion of public records is addressed by a number of such 
provisions. See also Rule 803(8) to (10) (hearsay excep-
tions for public records); Rule 1005 (best evidence 
exception for public records). 
Ancient Documents 
Rule 901(B)(8) provides a method for authenticating 
ancient documents, including data compilations. See 
Matuszewski v. Pancoast, 38 Ohio App.3d 74, 526 N.E.2d 
80 (1987); Romohr v. Frank, 20 Ohio Misc.2d 4, 485 
N.E.2d 841 (C.P. 1984). Under that provision an ancient 
document is authenticated by evidence showing the 
document "(a) is in such condition as to create no suspi-
cion concerning its authenticity, {b) was in a place where 
it, if authentic, would likely be, and (c) has been in exis-
tence twenty years or more at the time it is offered." 
Rule 901 governs only the authentication aspects of 
ancient documents; Rule 803(16) covers the hearsay 
aspects. The latter rule recognizes a hearsay exception 
for "[s]tatements in a doc4ment in existence twenty years 
or more the authenticity of which is established." The 
rule follows Federal Rule 803(16) in reducing the 
common law time period from thirty to twenty years. Data 
compilations as well as written documents are covered 
by the rule. 
The ancient documents rule originated not as an 
exception to the hearsay rule but as a rule of authentica-
tion. A number of jurisdictions, however, recognized a 
hearsay exception for ancient documents. See McCor-
mick, Evidence§ 323 (3d ed. 1984). The rationale under-
lying the exception is that the "danger of mistake is 
minimized by authentication requirements, and age 
affords assurance that the writing antedates the present 
controversy." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. A. Evid. 
803. 
The prior Ohio cases had recognized the ancient 
documents rule as both a hearsay exception and a meth-
od of authentication. See Broadsword v. Kauer, 161 Ohio 
St. 524, 120 N.E.2d 111 (1954) (method of authenticating 
wills, bonds, deeds, receipts, letters, and entries); Wright 
v. Hull, 83 Ohio St. 385, 94 N.E. 813 (1911); Bell v. 
Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 690, 10 N.E. 679 (1887); Burgan v. 
Siegman, 9 Ohio App. 84 (1917) (plats); Trustees of 
German Township v. Farmers & Citizens Savings Bank 
Co., 66 Ohio Abs. 332, 113 N.E.2d 409 (C.P. 1953) 
(newspaper notices), aff'd, 96 OhioApp. 483,,115 N.E.2d 
690 (1953). 
Process or System. 
Rule 901(B)(9) provides that evidence "describing a 
process or system used to produce a result and showing 
that the process or system produces an accurate result" 
is sufficient to authenticate evidence derived from such a 
process or system. The Advisory Committee's Note to 
Federal Rule 901 comments: 
Example (9) is designed for situations in which the 
accuracy of a result is dependent upon a process or 
system which produces it. X rays afford a familiar 
instance. Among more recent developments is the 
computer ... Example (9) does not, of course, 
foreclose taking judicial notice of the accuracy of the 
process or system. 
If the process or system is not an appropriate subject of 
judicial notice, expert testimony is often required to 
establish the accuracy of the process. See generally Rule 
201 Oudicial notice); Rule 702 (expert testimony). 
A leading case on the admissibility of computer 
evidence is Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 
132 N.W.2d 871 (1965). See also Freed1 Computer 
Print-Outs as Evidence, 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 273 
(1967); Roberts, A Practioner's Primer on Computer-
Generated Evidence, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 254 (1974); 5 
Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence§ 901(b)(9)[02] 
(1989). 
See .also State v. James,41 Ohio App.2d 248, 325 
N.E.2d 267 (1974) (sound recordings); In re Estate of 
Roth, 84 Ohio Abs. 345, 170 N.E.2d 313 (Prob. 1960) 
(sound recordings); United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639, 
641-42 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845 (1976) 
(surveillance camera photographs); 3Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 795 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (X-rays). 
Methods Provided by Statute or Rule 
Rule 901(B)(10) provides that "[a]ny method of authen-
tication or identification provided by statute enacted by 
the General Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio or by other rules prescribed by 
the Supreme Court" may be used to authenticate an item 
of evidence. 
A number of court rules deal with authentication. Ohio 
Civ. R. 44 provides for the authentication of domestic and 
foreign official records. Grim. R. 27 provides: "The proof 
of official records provisions of Civil Rule 44 ... apply in 
criminal cases." The authentication of official records is 
also subject to the self-authentication provisions of 
Rule 902. 
A number of statutes also deal with authentication. 
E.g., R.C. 2317.40 (authentication of business records); 
R.C. 2317.422 (authentication of hospital records). See 
Wood v. Elzoheary, 11 Ohio App.3d 27, 462 N.E.2d 1243 
(1983) (properly certified hospital bills are self-authenti-
cating records under R.C. 2317.422). 
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IDENTIFICATION OF A SPEAKER 
Voice Identification 
Rule 901(b)(5) provides for the ident~fication of a 
person's voice, "whether heard firsthand or through 
mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by 
opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under 
circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker." 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 901 
states: "Since aural voice identification is not a subject of 
expert testimony, the requisite familiarity may be 
acquired either before or after the particular speaking 
which is the subject of the identification, in this respect 
resembling visual identification of a person rather than 
identification of handwriting." · · 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See Bedford 
Heights v. Tallarico, 25 Ohio St.2d 211, 267 N.E.2d 802 
(1971) (sufficiency of voice .identification in criminal 
cases); State v. Williams, 64 Ohio App.2d 271, 413 N.E.2d 
1212 (1979). Bee also State v. Dick, 27 Ohio St.2d 162, 
167, 271 N.E.2d 797 (1971) (voice identification procedure 
challenged); In re Estate of Roth, 84 Ohio Abs. 345, 170 
N.E.2d 313 (Prob, 1960) (sound recording of voice 
authenticated); 1 Wigmore, Evider~ce § 660, 669 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1979); 7/d. § 2155 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
Rule 901(8)(5) applies only to aural voice identification. 
The use of voiceprints for the purpose of identification 
involves a comparison and is.therefore subject to Rule 
901(8)(3) and is discussed below. · 
Telephone Conversations 
Rule 901 (8)(6) provides for the authentication of tele-
phone conversations. Evldence that a telephone call was 
made to a number which was assigned at the time by the 
telephone company to a particular person or business is 
sufficient evidence of authentication "if (a) in the case of 
a person, circumstances, including self-identification, 
show the person answering to be the one called, or (b) in 
the case of a business, the call was made to a place of · 
business and the conversation related to business 
reasonably transacted over the telephone." 
The rule applies only to the authentication of telephone 
calls made by the witness to the person or number in 
question (outgoing calls). See State v. Vrona, 47 Ohio 
App.3d 145, 547 N.E.2d 1189 (1988); Travelers Insurance 
Co. v. Automobile Trader, Inc., 3 Ohio App.3d 270,444 
N.E.2d 1033 (1981). Incoming as well as outgoing calls 
may be authenticated by identification of the speaker's 
voice under Rule 901 (8)(5), by the content of the conver-
sation, or by the reply technique, Rule 901(8)(4). 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 901 
reads: 
The cases are in agreement that a mere assertion of 
his identity by a person talking on the telephone is not 
sufficient evidence of the authenticity of the conversa-
tion and that additional evidence need not fall in any 
set pattern. Thus the content of his statements or the 
reply technique, under Example (4), supra, or voice · 
identification under Example (5), may furnish the nec-
essary foundation. Outgoing calls made by the witness 
involve additional factors bearing upon authenticity. 
The calling of a number assigned by the telephone 
company reasonably supports the assumption that the 
listing is correct and that the number is the one 
reached. If the number is that of a place of business, 
the mass of authority allows an ensuing conversation if 
it relates to business reasonably transacted over the 
telephone, on the theory that the maintenance of the 
telephone connection is an invitation to do business 
without further identification ... Otherwise, some 
additional circumstance of identification of the speaker 
is required. The authorities divide on the question 
whether the self-identifying statement of the person 
answering suffices. Example (6) answers in the affirm-
ative on the assumption that usual conduct respecting 
telephone calls furnish adequate assurances of 
regularity, bearing in mind that the entire matter is 
open to exploration before the trier of fact ... 
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. See State v. 
Williams, 64 Ohio App.2d 271, 413 N.E.2d 1212 (1979); 
Farris v. Columbus, 85 Ohio App. 385, 85 N.E.2d 605 
(1948); Leonard v. Mowbray, 21 Ohio App. 268, 153 N.E. 
197 (1926). See also Bedford Heights v. Tallarico, 25 Ohio 
St.2d 211, 267 N.E.2d 802 (1971); McCormick, Evidence§ 
226 {3d ed. 1984); 7 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2155 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1978). 
Voiceprint Evidence 
The question of whether voiceprint (sound spectrome-
try) evidence is admissible has divided the courts. See 
Annat., 97 A.L.R.3d 294 (1980). In State v. Olderman, 44 
Ohio App.2d 130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975), the court 
upheld the admissibility of voiceprint evidence, holding 
that the technique had been generally accepted by the 
scientific community. In State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d 
53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983), the Ohio Supreme Court 
upheld the admissibility of voiceprint evidence. Unfor-
tunately, the Court apparently did not consider the 
National Academy of Sciences publication, On the 
Theory and Practice of Voice lndentification {1979), which 
raised serious doubts about the validity of voiceprint 
evidence. See Symposium on Science and the Rules of 
Evidence, 99 F.R.D.187, 207-08 (1983). 
See generally Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence ch. 10 (1986); Tosi, Voice Identification, Theory 
and Legal Applications (1979). 
SELF-AUTHENTICATION 
Rule 902 provides for the self-authentication of certain 
types of documents. These documents are presumed to 
be genuine and therefore require no extrinsic evidence of 
authenticity. The opposing party, of course, may 
introduce evidence attacking the authenticity of these 
documents. See Advisory Committee's note, Fed. R. 
Evid. 902 ("In no instance is the opposite party fore-
closed from disputing authenticity."). 
Rule 902 governs only authentication. An authentic 
document may be inadmissable nevertheless because it 
fails to satisfy the requirements of the hearsay rule (Rule 
802), or the best evidence rule (Rule 1002), or because 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect (Rule 403(A)). 
Domestic Public Documents Under Seal 
Rule 902(1) provides that a document bearing (1) the 
seal of a governmental entity or agency and (2) a signa-
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ture purporting to be an attestation or execution is self-
authenticating. The rule applies to both federal and state 
documents. Several other evidence rules give special 
treatment to public records. Rules803(8) to {10) (hearsay 
exceptions for public records); Rule 1005 (best evidence 
rule exception for public records). 
Statutes which govern the use of seal-bearing docu-
ments as evidence include: 
R.C. 1125.19 (records of superintendent of banks 
bearing seal admissible); R.C. 2967.06 (copy of warrant 
of pardon and commutation bearing seal admissible); 
R.C. 3901.06 (instruments of superintendent of insur-
ance bearing seal admissible); R.C. 4507.25 (records 
of registrar of motor vehicles bearing seal admissible). 
Domestic Public Documents Not Under Seal 
Rule 902(2) provides that domestic public documents 
without a seal are self-authenticating if accompanied by 
a certificate of authentication (1) which is signed under 
seal by a public officer having a seal and (2) which certi-
fies that the signer of the document has the official 
capacity claimed and that the signature is genuine. The 
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 902 states: 
"While statutes are found which raise a presumption of 
genuineness of purported official signatures in the 
absence of an official seal, ... the greater ease of effect-
ing a: forgery under these circumstances is apparent. 
Hence this paragraph ofthe rule calls for authentication 
by an officer who has a seal." 
Foreign Public Documents 
Rule 902(3) provides that a foreign public document is 
self-authenticating if (1) it is purported to have been 
executed or attested by a person, in his official capacity, 
authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the 
execution or attestation, and (2) it is accompanied by a 
final certificate of authentication. A final certification may 
be made by U.S. diplomatic personnel serving in the 
foreign country or by diplomatic personnel of the foreign 
country assigned or accredited to the United States. The 
rule allows the court to waive the final certification 
requirement where all the parties have had a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate the authenticity of the foreign 
document and good cause is shown. 
See generally Matuszewki v. Pancoast, 38 Ohio App.3d 
74, 526 N.E.2d 80 (1987); Nikolm v. Mandich, 3 Ohio 
App.3d 232, 444 N.E.2d 1039 (1981); 7 Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 2163 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
Certified Copies of Public R.ecords 
Rule 902(4) provides that copies of official records, offi-
cial reports, and recorded documents are self-authenti-
cating if (1) certified as correct by the custodian or other 
authorized person, and (2) accompanied by a certificate 
of authentication complying with Rules 902(1), (2), or (3), 
or complying with the law of any jurisdiction, or comply-
ing with a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 902 
comments: 
The common law and innumerable statutes have 
recognized the procedure of authenticating copies of 
public records by certificate. The certificate qualifies 
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as a public document, receivable as authentic when in 
conformitywith·paragraph (1), (2), or (3). Rule 44(a) of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 27 of the Rules 
of Criminal Procedure have provided authentication 
procedures of this nature for both domestic and foreign. 
public records. It will be observed that the certification 
procedure here provided extends only to public 
records, reports, and recorded documents, all includ-
ing data compilations, and does not apply to public 
documents generally. Hence documents provable 
when presented in original form under paragraphs (1), 
(2), or (3) may not be provable by certified copy under 
paragraph (4). 
See arso Slate v. Walker, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 374 N.E.2d 
132 (1978) (certified copy of police log book admitted); 
Price v. Price, 4 Ohio App.3d 217, 219, 447 N.E.2d 769 
(1982) (certified copy of divorce decree). 
Official Publications 
Rule 902{5) provides that "[b]ooks, pamphlets, or other 
publications purporting to be issued by public authority" 
are self"authenticating. The Advisory Committee's Note 
to Federal Rule 902 reads: "Dispensing with preliminary 
proof of the genuineness of purportedly official publica-
tions, most commonly encountered in connection with 
statutes, court reports, rules, and regulations, has been 
greatly enlarged by statutes and decisions. 5 Wigmore § 
1684. Paragraph (5), it will be noted, does not confer ad-
missibility upon all official publication; it merely provides 
a means whereby their authenticity may be taken as 
established for purposes of admissibility. Rule 44(a) of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure has been to the same effect." 
Newsp_ap_ers and Periodicals 
Rule 902{6) provides that "[p]rinted materials purport-
ing to be newspapers orperiodicals, including notices 
and advertisements contained therein" are self-authenti-
cating. The phrase "including notices and advertise-
ments contained therein" does not appear in Federal 
Rule 902(6). The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal 
Rule 902 comments: "The likelihood of forgery of 
newspapers or periodicals is slight indeed. Hence no 
danger is apparent in receiving them. Establishing the 
authenticity of the publication may, of course, leave still 
open questions of authority and responsibility for items 
therein contained." See also State v. Greer, 39 Ohio St.3d 
236,530 N.E.2d 382 {1988) (TV Guide); 7 Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 2150 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
The rule deals only with authentication. A newspaper 
account may be inadmissible because of some other 
6 
evidentiary rule. E.g., Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalga-
mated Assn. of Street Electric Railway & Motor Coach 
Employees, 84 Ohio App. 43; 81 N.E.2d 310 (1948) (news-
paper account hearsay). 
Trade Inscriptions 
Rule 902(7) provides that "[i)nscriptions, signs, tags, or 
labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of 
business and indicating ownership, control, or origin" are 
self-authenticating. 
See also Cincinnati Transit, Inc. v. Tapley, 28 Ohio 
App.2d 26, 273 N.E.2d 906 (1971) (markings on side of 
truck prima facie evidence of control); 1 Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 150a (rev. 1940); 7 /d. § 2152 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1978). 
Acknowledged Documents 
Rule 902(8) provides that documents "accompanied 
by a certifi.cate of acknowledgment executed in the 
manner provided by law by a notary public or other offi-
cer authorized by law to take acknowledgments" are self-
authenticating. 
See also Gambrinus Stock Co. v. Weber, 41 Ohio St. 
689 (1885) (certificate of notary public prima facie verifi-
cation of chattel mortgage); 7 Wigmore, Evidence§ 2165 
(Chadbourn rev.1978). 
Commercial Paper and Related Documents 
Rule 902{9) provides that "[c]ommercial paper, signa-
tures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the 
extent provided by general commercial law" are self-
authenticating. The rule is based on the authentication 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code(§ 1-202, 
3-307, 3-510), which have been adopted in Ohio. 
Presumptions Created by L.Bw 
Rule 902(10) provides that "[a)ny signat~.:: J, document, 
or other matter declared by any law of a jurisdiction, state 
or federal, to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or 
authentic" is self-authenticating. See generally 7 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 2162 (Chadbourne rev. 1978). 
The rule is not limited to Ohio statutes; it applies as 
well to federal statutes and to the statutes of other states. 
E.g., 10 U.S.C § 936(d) (signature of certain military 
officers prima facie evidence of authenticity); 15 U.S.C § 
6064 (signature on tax return prima facie genuine). Ohio 
statutes include: R.C. 313.10 (records of coroner admiss-
able); R.C. 2925.51 (laboratory reports in controlled 
substance prosecutions prima facie evidence). 
